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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 20-60702-CIV-SINGHAL
JANE DOE, a minor,
Plaintiff,
v.
KIK INTERACTIVE, INC., a Canadian corporation,
and MEDIALAB.AI INC., a Delaware corporation,
Defendants.
_________________________________________/
ORDER
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (DE [24]).
Plaintiff, a minor proceeding pseudonymously, has filed a Complaint (DE [1]) seeking
damages from Defendants, Kik Interactive, Inc. and Medialab AI Inc. 1 under the
Trafficking Victims Protections Act (“TVPA”), 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). Defendants moved to
dismiss arguing they are immune from suit or alternatively, that Plaintiff has failed to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff has filed a memorandum in opposition
(DE [29]) and Defendant has filed its reply memorandum (DE [33]). For the reasons set
forth below, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (DE [24]) is granted.
I.

BACKGROUND
Defendants own and operate a web-based interactive service known as Kik

Interactive or “Kik.” According to Plaintiff, Kik is marketed to teenagers and young adults
for purposes of sending messages to other users. (Compl. ¶ 25-26). The Complaint

1

MediaLabs, Inc. acquired Kik Interactive on or around October 29, 2019 and is the current owner-operator
of the Kik Interactive service.

1
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alleges multiple instances where adult users of Kik have used the service to contact and
solicit sexual activity with minors, with some of those contacts resulting in death of the
minors. (Compl. ¶ 15-23). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have knowledge that sexual
predators use its service to prey on minors but have failed to provide any warnings or
enact policies to protect minors from such abuses. (Compl. ¶ 45).
Plaintiff alleges that in July 2019 numerous adult male users of Kik (“Identified Kik
Users”) solicited her and convinced her to take and send them sexually graphic pictures
of herself using Kik. (Compl. ¶ 15-23). She also alleges these adult males sent her
sexually explicit photographs via Kik. 2 (Id.) Her father found the photographs on her
cellphone and computer tablet and reported the incidents to the police. (Id.).

The

cellphone and tablet were turned over to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement.
(Id.).
Plaintiff filed suit under the civil remedy statute, Trafficking Victims Protection Act,
18 U.S.C. § 1595. She alleges that Defendants are liable for damages for knowingly
“participat[ing] in IDENTIFIED KIK USERS’ venture in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591 by
benefiting from, and knowingly facilitating (by not implementing policies sufficient to
combat a known problem), the venture in which IDENTIFIED KIK USERS used Kik
Messenger in the interstate commerce to subject Jane Doe to sex trafficking.” (Compl.
¶ 42). She also alleges Defendants “knew, or were in reckless disregard of the facts, that
it was the practice of IDENTIFIED KIK USERS to utilize Kik Messenger to furnish harmful
materials such as pictures of men’s genitalia to Jane Doe and subject Jane Doe to sex
trafficking . . . [but] continued to market Kik Messenger to underage users without a

2

For purposes of this motion the parties did not dispute that this conduct falls under the federal definition
of “sex trafficking.”

2
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sufficient warning and implementation of sufficient polices to protect the underage users
of Kik Messenger.” (Compl. ¶ 43, 44).
Defendants move to dismiss on two grounds. First, they argue immunity from suit
pursuant to the Computer Decency Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230(a); second, for failure
to state a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a).
II.

LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Motion to Dismiss Standards.
At the pleading stage, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the

claim showing the [plaintiff] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Although Rule 8(a)
does not require “detailed factual allegations,” it does require “more than labels and
conclusions”; a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell
Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). To survive a motion to dismiss, “factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and must
be sufficient “to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 555. “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The mere possibility the defendant acted unlawfully
is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.” Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d
1252, 1261 (11th Cir. 2009), abrogated on other grounds by Mohamad v. Palestinian
Auth., 556 U.S. 449 (2012).
In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court=s review is generally
“limited to the four corners of the complaint.” Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d
949, 959 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting St. George v. Pinellas Cty., 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th

3
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Cir. 2002)). In reviewing the complaint, the court must do so in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff, and it must generally accept the plaintiff=s well-pleaded facts as true. See
Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Am. United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez,
480 F.3d 1043, 1057 (11th Cir. 2007).

But “[c]onclusory allegations, unwarranted

deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal.”
Jackson v. Bellsouth Telecommunications, 372 F.3d 1250, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation
omitted); see also Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (“[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true
all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions“).
B. Immunity Under the Communications Decency Act
Defendants argue that they are immune from suit under the Communications
Decency Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230. Section 230, entitled “Protection for private
blocking and screening of offensive material,” begins with a list of “Findings” and “Policy”:
(a) Findings
The Congress finds the following:
(1) The rapidly developing array of Internet and other interactive
computer services available to individual Americans represent an
extraordinary advance in the availability of educational and
informational resources to our citizens.
(2) These services offer users a great deal of control over the
information that they receive, as well as the potential for even greater
control in the future as technology develops.
(3) The internet and other interactive computer services offer a forum for
a true diversity of public discourse, unique opportunities for cultural
development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity.
(4) The Internet and other interactive computer services have flourished,
to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of governmental
regulation.

4
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(5) ncreasingly Americans are relying on interactive media for a variety of
political, educational, cultural, and entertainment services.
(b) Policy
It is the policy of the United States –
(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and other
interactive computer services and other interactive media;
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists
for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by
Federal or State regulation;
(3) to encourage the development of technologies which maximize user
control over what information is received by individuals, families, and
schools who use the Internet and other interactive computer services;
(4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking
and filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict their
children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate online material; and
(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and
punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of
computer.
47 U.S.C. § 230(a) and (b).

In recognition of those stated findings and policies,

subsection (c) of the CDA provides that “[n]o provider ... of an interactive computer service
shall be treated as a publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). This is the immunity provision relied
upon by Defendants. In addition to granting immunity to interactive service providers for
content created by third parties, Congress also expressly preempted all state laws that
are inconsistent with this immunity. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) (“No cause of action may be
brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent
with this section.”).

5
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C. FOSTA Exception to Immunity
In 2018, Congress enacted the Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (“FOSTA”) and
removed sex trafficking from CDA immunity. FOSTA provides that “[n]othing in this
section (other than subsection (c)(2)(A)) shall be construed to impair or limit . . . any claim
in a civil action under section 1595 of Title 18, if the conduct underlying the claim
constitutes a violation of section 1591 of that title.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5)(A). This is the
provision relied upon by Plaintiff.
D. Sex Trafficking Claims Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591, 1595
FOSTA permits claims for civil damages to be made against interactive computer
service providers under § 1595, if “the conduct underlying the claim constitutes a violation
of section 1591.” Section 1595 is the Civil Remedy provision of the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act and provides as follows:
An individual who is a victim of a violation of this chapter may
bring a civil action against the perpetrator (or whoever
knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value
from participation in a venture which that person knew or
should have known has engaged in an act in violation of this
chapter) in an appropriate district court of the United States
and may recover damages and reasonable attorneys fees.
18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). Section 1591(a) criminalizes certain conduct:
(a) Whoever knowingly –
(1) in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce . . . recruits,
entices, harbors, transports, provides, obtains,
advertises, maintains, patronizes, or solicits by any
means a person; or

6
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(2) benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value,
from participation in a venture which has engaged in an
act described in violation of paragraph (1),
knowing, or except where the act constituting the violation
of paragraph (1) is advertising, in reckless disregard of the
fact, that means of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion
described in subsection (e)(2), or any combination of such
means will be used to cause the person to engage in a
commercial sex act, or that the person has not attained the
age of 18 years and will be caused to engage in a
commercial sex act, will be punished as provided in
subsection (b).

18 U.S.C. § 1591(a). “The term ‘participation in a venture’ means knowingly assisting,
supporting, or facilitating a violation of subsection (a)(1).” 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(4). 3
III.

MOTION TO DISMISS
Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint arguing they are entitled to immunity

under the CDA, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). The primary purpose of the CDA “was to protect
children from sexually explicit internet content.” FTC v. LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d
158, 173 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing 141 Cong. Rec. S1953 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1995) (statement
of Sen. Exon)). “Section 230, though – added as an amendment to the CDA bill – was
enacted to maintain the robust nature of Internet communication and, accordingly, to keep
government interference in the medium to a minimum.” Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d
53, 63 (2d Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 206 L. Ed. 2d 936 (May 18, 2020) (quotations omitted).
“Indeed, Congress stated in Section 230 that ‘[i]t is the policy of the United States – (1) to
promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer
services and other interactive media; [and] (2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive

3

The phrase “participation in a venture” is not defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1595.
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free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services,
unfettered by Federal or State regulation.’” Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)-(2)).
“Congress made a policy choice . . . not to deter harmful online speech through the
separate route of imposing tort liability on companies that serve as intermediaries for
other parties' potentially injurious messages.” Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327,
330–31 (4th Cir. 1997). The Zeran court succinctly explained the reasons behind the
Congressional policy decision:
Congress' purpose in providing the § 230 immunity was thus
evident. Interactive computer services have millions of users. See
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. [884], __, 117 S. Ct. at 2334 (noting that
at time of district court trial, “commercial online services had
almost 12 million individual subscribers”). The amount of
information communicated via interactive computer services is
therefore staggering. The specter of tort liability in an area of such
prolific speech would have an obvious chilling effect. It would be
impossible for service providers to screen each of their millions
of postings for possible problems. Faced with potential liability for
each message republished by their services, interactive
computer service providers might choose to severely restrict the
number and type of messages posted. Congress considered the
weight of the speech interests implicated and chose to immunize
service providers to avoid any such restrictive effect.
Id. at 331.
“There are three elements to a claim of immunity under Section 230(c). The
defendant must show that: “(1) [it] ‘is a provider . . . of an interactive computer service, (2)
the claim is based on information provided by another information content provider and
(3) the claim would treat the defendant as the publisher or speaker of that information.’”
Herrick v. Grindr, LLC, 306 F. Supp. 3d 579, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), aff'd, 765 Fed. Appx.
586 (2d Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 221 (2019) (quoting LeadClick Media, LLC,
838 F.3d at 173 (additional citations omitted)). “The majority of federal circuits have

8
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interpreted the CDA to establish broad ‘federal immunity to any cause of action that would
make service providers liable for information originating with a third-party user of the
service.’” Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.
Numerous courts have recognized CDA immunity in claims made against
providers of interactive computer services arising from content produced by their users.
For instance, a defamation claim against Google based upon posts made by a third-party
user was dismissed due to immunity under the CDA. Shuler v. Duke, 2018 WL 2445685,
at *10 (N.D. Ala. May 31, 2018), aff'd, 792 Fed. Appx. 697 (11th Cir. 2019).

See also

Mezey v. Twitter, Inc., 2018 WL 5306769 (S.D. Fla. Jul. 19, 2018) (CDA barred claim that
defendant unlawfully suspended his Twitter account); Herrick, 306 F. Supp. 3d 579 (CDA
barred claims against Grndr that arose from publication of an account that impersonated
plaintiff); McMillan v. Amazon.com, Inc., 433 F. Supp.3d 1034, 1045 (S.D. Tex. 2020)
(CDA barred negligence action against Amazon arising from a failure to warn of dangers
of a product sold on its site). “In general, this section protects websites from liability for
material posted on the website by someone else.” Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d
846, 850 (9th Cir. 2016). If not for the nature of Plaintiff’s claims in this case, Defendants
would satisfy the elements for CDA immunity: they are an interactive computer service
provider, 4 the claim is based upon information provided by another, and the claim would
treat Defendants as though they published and solicited the photographs in question.
Plaintiff denies that her claims treat Defendants as though they were merely
publishers of the explicit photographs and videos. She asserts that her claim is that

4

The parties do not dispute that Defendants are an “interactive computer service provider.”
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Defendants violated 18 U.S.C. § 1591 by failing to enact policies that would have
prevented her from being trafficked by fellow Kik users. But this is exactly the type of claim
that CDA immunity bars. See Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 420 (5th Cir. 2008)
(MySpace immune under CDA from a claim that it failed to protect a user from sexual
predators). Although the MySpace decision pre-dated FOSTA, it is clear that FOSTA
does not subject interactive computer service providers to liability for any cause of action
that might otherwise be available under common law. Rather, FOSTA removes CDA
immunity only for claims “under section 1595 of Title 18, if the conduct underlying the
claim constitutes a violation of section 1591 of that title.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5)(A). Had
Congress intended to revoke CDA immunity for all claims involving sex trafficking on
websites (as argued by Plaintiff), it could have done so; but it did not. The plain language
of the statute removes immunity only for conduct that violates 18 U.S.C § 1591.
The parties dispute the level of mens rea a defendant must possess for a claim
under FOSTA to overcome CDA immunity.

The confusion arises from the phrase

“participation in a venture” in both § 1591 (the criminal statute) and § 1595(a) (the civil
remedy statute). The criminal statute defines “participation in a venture” as “knowingly
assisting, supporting, or facilitating a violation of subsection (a)(1).” 18 U.S.C. 1591(e)(4).
The civil remedy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1595, does not define “participation in a venture.”
Defendants argue that to defeat CDA immunity the § 1591(e)(4) definition applies and
Plaintiff must – but has failed to -- show that Defendants benefitted from participation in
a venture that knowingly assisted, supported, or facilitated Plaintiff being trafficked. See
United States v. Afyare, 632 Fed. Appx. 272, 286 (6th Cir. 2016) (liability under § 1591
requires active participation in trafficking venture).

10
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Plaintiff argues that “participation in a venture” as used in § 1595(a) does not
incorporate the definition contained in § 1591(e)(4) and to do so would render superfluous
the language “knew or should have known” contained in § 1595(a). Plaintiff argues that
for liability under § 1595(a) to exist she need only show that Defendants “knew or should
have known” that it was participating in a venture that was engaged in sex trafficking in
violation of § 1591. She cites other known instances of sexual predators utilizing Kik to
establish that Defendants knew or should have known of the possibility that she would be
subjected to trafficking. (Compl. ¶¶ 15-23).
If Defendants were not interactive computer service providers, Plaintiff’s argument
might prevail. A recent decision from the Middle District of Florida identified the elements
of a civil claim under § 1595(a). S.Y. v. Naples Hotel Co., 2020 WL 4504976, at *2 (M.D.
Fla. Aug. 5, 2020). The court conducted a thorough review of cases involving claimed
liability under § 1595(a) and found that the majority of “courts determined that [§] 1595
includes a constructive knowledge element, and that applying the definition of
‘participation in a venture’ provided for in § 1591(e) to the requirements under § 1595
would void the ‘known or should have known’ language of § 1595.” Id. (citing M.A. v.
Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 3d 959, 969 (S.D. Ohio 2019); J.C. v.
Choice Hotels Int’l Inc., 2020 WL 3035794, *1 n.1 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 5, 2020); A.B. v. Marriott
Int’l Inc., 2020 WL 1939678, *13 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 2020); Doe S.W. v. Lorain-Elyria Motel,
Inc., 2020 WL 1244192, *6 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 16, 2020); H.H. v. G6 Hosp., LLC, 2019 WL
6682152, *4 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 6, 2019)). Because § 1595(a) requires that a defendant
“knew or should have known” that it was benefitting from or participating in a trafficking

11
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venture, the “negligence standard of constructive knowledge” applies. H.H., 2019 WL
6682152, at *1. 5
The S.Y. case and the cases cited above all involved hotel defendants who were
alleged to have constructive knowledge that the plaintiffs were being trafficked on their
properties. Significantly, because the hotel defendants were not interactive computer
service providers, neither FOSTA nor CDA immunity were considered. The present case
presents a different scenario, because Congress – in balancing the needs of protecting
children and encouraging “robust Internet communication” – enacted a statute protecting
interactive computer service providers from liability for their users’ content and conduct.
If it were not for FOSTA, Defendants in this case would be completely immune from
liability under the CDA. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(5); MySpace, 528 F.3d 413.
To resolve Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, this Court must consider the extent to
which FOSTA has affected the immunity provided by the CDA. Again, FOSTA states that
““[n]othing in this section (other than subsection (c)(2)(A)) shall be construed to impair or
limit . . . any claim in a civil action under section 1595 of Title 18, if the conduct underlying
the claim constitutes a violation of section 1591 of that title.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5)(A)
(emphasis added). Plaintiff argues that as a result of FOSTA, “the exacting standard of
‘actual knowledge’ and ‘overt act’ employed in a criminal prosecution under § 1591 is
replaced by [a] ‘constructive knowledge’ standard when a civil recovery is sought under
the TVPA.” (DE [29], p. 21). But this argument would have the Court disregard the plain

5

The Court notes that Plaintiff does not allege any facts that would plausibly establish Defendants knew or
should have known about her particular situation or that the Identified Kik Users were using Kik for sex
trafficking. Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants knew of the Identified Kik User’s practice of using Kik to
furnish harmful, sexually explicit photographs (Compl. ¶ 43, 44) are conclusory and lack factual support.
Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (conclusions and unwarranted deductions of fact will not prevent dismissal).
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language and structure of FOSTA. “A statute should be interpreted so that no words shall
be discarded as meaningless, redundant, or mere surplusage.” United States v. DBB,
Inc., 180 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted).
Defendants argue that the Congressional history of FOSTA 6 shows that Congress
only intended to create a narrow exception to the CDA for “openly malicious actors such
as Backpage where it was plausible for a plaintiff to allege actual knowledge and overt
participation.” (DE [33], p. 5) and that a finding of actual knowledge and overt participation
in a venture of sexual trafficking is required to defeat CDA immunity. This is consistent
with the language of FOSTA. By its terms, FOSTA did not abrogate CDA immunity for all
claims arising from sex trafficking; FOSTA permits civil liability for websites only “if the
conduct underlying the claim constitutes a violation of section 1591.” And section 1591
requires knowing and active participation in sex trafficking by the defendants. Afyare,
632 Fed. Appx. at 286; see also Geiss v. Weinstein Co. Holdings, LLC, 383 F. Supp. 3d
156, 169 (S.D.N.Y 2019) (“aiders and abettors of sex trafficking are liable under the TVPA
only if they knowingly ‘benefit[ ], financially or by receiving anything of value from
participating in a venture which has engaged in’ sex trafficking”) (quoting 18 U.S.C. §
1591(a)); Noble v. Weinstein, 335 F. Supp. 3d 504, 524 (S.D. NY 2018) (“Plaintiff must
allege specific conduct that furthered the sex trafficking venture. Such conduct must have
been undertaken with the knowledge, or in reckless disregard of the fact, that it was
furthering the alleged sex trafficking venture. In other words, some participation in the sex
trafficking act itself must be shown.”).

6 See 164 Cong. Rec., at S1860-62 (“[FOSTA] is a narrowly crafted bill that would ensure that Section 230
of the Communications Decency Act does not provide legal immunity to websites like Backpage that
knowingly facilitate sex trafficking.”); H.R. Rep. No 115-572, at 5 (“general knowledge that sex trafficking
occurs on a website will not suffice as the knowledge element must be proven as to a specific victim”).
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Plaintiff has not alleged facts that would plausibly establish that Defendants
knowingly participated in the sex trafficking venture involving her; she alleges that
Defendants knew that other sex trafficking incidents occurred on Kik. This does not
satisfy FOSTA’s requirement that the conduct underlying the claim violate 18 U.S.C. §
1591. For this reason, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants are barred by the immunity
provisions of the CDA, 47 U.S.C. § 230(e), and the Complaint, therefore, must be
dismissed.
IV.

LEAVE TO AMEND
Plaintiff requests leave to amend her complaint to add causes of action in

negligence and strict liability for failure to warn about the dangers of being sexually
exploited associated with using Kik Messenger. This request contravenes § 230(e)(3) of
the CDA, which preempts state law: “No cause of action may be brought and no liability
may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.” 47
U.S.C. § 230(e)(3). Plaintiff argues that a failure to warn claim is not barred by § 230 and
relies upon Doe, 824 F.3d 846. In that case, the owners of a website called Model
Mayhem were aware of two individuals who had obtained victims’ contact information
from Model Mayhem’s site and used the information to lure them into fake auditions where
they were drugged and raped. After the plaintiff suffered the same horrific fate, she sued
the website’s owner for failure to warn under California law. The court held that CDA
immunity did not bar the claims, but nothing in the plaintiff’s claims involved Internet
Brands’ actions as a publisher of content:
Jane Doe herself posted her profile, but she does not seek to
hold Internet Brands liable for its content. Nor does she allege
that Flanders and Callum posted anything to the website. The
Complaint alleges only that “JANE DOE was contacted by
14
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Lavont Flanders through MODELMAYHEM.COM using a fake
identity.” Jane Doe does not claim to have been lured by any
posting that Internet Brands failed to remove. Internet Brands
is also not alleged to have learned of the predators' activity
from any monitoring of postings on the website, nor is its
failure to monitor postings at issue.
Instead, Jane Doe attempts to hold Internet Brands
liable for failing to warn her about information it obtained from
an outside source about how third parties targeted and lured
victims through Model Mayhem. The duty to warn allegedly
imposed by California law would not require Internet Brands
to remove any user content or otherwise affect how it
publishes or monitors such content.
Id. at 851. By contrast, in this case Plaintiff’s failure to warn claims are inextricably
linked to the harmful content solicited and posted by Kik’s users. This is precisely the
type of claim for which Congress has determined that interactive computer website
providers should be immune.
Although leave to amend should be freely granted, the court may decline to grant
leave to amend if the amendment would be futile. Futility justifies the denial of leave to
amend where the complaint, as amended, would still be subject to dismissal. Burger King
Corp. v. Weaver, 169 F.3d 1310, 1320 (11th Cir.1999) (citations omitted). Because
Plaintiff’s proposed causes of action would be subject to dismissal, the Court will deny
leave to file an amended complaint. Accordingly, it is hereby
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ORDERED AND AJUDGED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (DE [24]) is
GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Clerk of Court
is directed to CLOSE this case and DENY AS MOOT any pending motions.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 31st day of
August 2020.

Copies furnished counsel via CM/ECF
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